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Abstract: The social welfare effect of positional concerns over public goods is composed of two parts, 
a  positional  outcome  and  an  outcome  in  terms  of  public  goods  provision.    When  agents  have 
homogenous  positional  preferences  over the  public good,  they  overinvest in  the  positional  public 
good, resulting in a zero-sum positional race with a higher provision of the public good. When agents 
differ in their positional preferences, the overall impact on social welfare is positive when endowments 
are homogenous and uncertain when endowments are heterogeneous. Given that the social loss from 
position-seeking is lower than the social gain from rank seeking, there is an increase of social welfare. 
If agents have different initial endowments, positional preferences might still be welfare enhancing as 
long as the positional loss does not exceed the gain in terms of public good provision. 
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Can Positional Concerns Enhance the Private provision of Public Goods? 
 
1. Introduction 
It is widely recognized that people care for their relative position. Nevertheless the co-existence of 
positional goods (status being the ultimate positional good
2) with non-positional goods may generate a 
crucial social dilemna. According to Frank (2005, p.137),  "the  conflict  stems  from  the  fact  that 
concerns about relative consumption are stronger in some domains than in others. The disparity gives 
rise to expenditure arms races focused on positional goods—those for which relative position matters 
most. The result is to divert resources from non-positional goods, causing welfare losses." Because of 
the very specific nature of positional goods (Hirsch, 1976), seeking a higher rank is necessarily gained 
at the expense of other agents, resulting in zero or negative sum games. Each step up the ladder of 
status for one person logically requires a step down for another. For instance, there is no place for an 
eleventh economist on a „Top Ten‟ list. Consequently, status seeking agents make expenditures on 
positional goods to get a higher relative position, but as all agents make the same efforts, all obtain an 
identical position. In an economy with private consumption goods, positional preferences lead to a 
welfare loss, which can be aggravated if public negative externalities are considered (Ng and Wang, 
1993; Van Long and Wang, 2008; Frank, 2008). 
 
Although positional motivations for purchase have been identified early (e.g., Veblen, 1899; Hirsch, 
1976;  Frank,  1985;  Alpizar  et  al.,  2005),  theoretical  and  empirical  investigations  about  their 
importance in relation to public goods are very scarce (e.g., Holländer, 1990; Solnick and Hemenway, 
2005). Contrasting with this literature gap, anecdotal evidence supports that charitable contributions or 
contributions to public goods may be motivated by positional concerns. For instance, Turner inspired 
the successful idea of the Slate 60 list of the top American donors. Indeed, he argued that the Forbes 
400 list of richest Americans was discouraging the wealthy from giving away their money for fear of 
slipping down the rankings. "When Ted Tuner forked over $ 200 million to charity two years ago, he 
felt a tremor … Instead of the joy of giving, he was consumed by the fear of falling… off the Forbes 
Four Hundred list of wealthiest Americans. The man …. has another great idea. Why not start an 
annual  list  of  the  most  generous,  offering  an  'Ebenezer  Scrooge  Prize'  that  embarrasses  stingy 
billionaires and 'heart of Gold Award' to honour philanthropists?" (Dowd, 1996). Simply put, we 
explore whether positional concerns can improve social welfare through a higher level of private 
provision of public goods. 
                                                            
2 Even if there are some possible distinctions between status and position, we use these two terms 
interchangeably in this contribution.   
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Using a model of voluntary contribution to a public good, we show that positional preferences might 
be a driver in public good provision and increase social welfare. When agents have homogenous 
positional preferences over the public good, they overinvest in the positional public good. There is no 
positional gain (everyone runs to keep at the same place), but a higher provision of the public good. 
Indeed, positional preferences allow public good provision, prevent free rider behaviour and thus 
increase social welfare. When agents differ in their positional preferences over the public good, the 
overall impact on social welfare is positive when endowments are homogenous and uncertain when 
endowments  are  heterogeneous.  When  endowments  are  homogenous,  the intuition is  as follows :  
individuals who invest in the public good are those who have the highest positional preferences (and 
gain the most in terms of rank) whereas individuals who free ride are those who place the lowest value 
on their rank (and lose the less). Given that the social loss from rank-seeking is lower than the social 
gain  from  rank-seeking,  there  is  an  increase  of  social  welfare.  If  agents  have  different  initial 
endowments,  this result  is  not  always  true and  the economy  might  suffer  from  a  positional  loss. 
Positional preferences might still be welfare enhancing as long as the positional loss does not exceed 
the gain in terms of public good provision. 
 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a basic framework of consumer behaviour with 
positional preferences and shows that the standard free riding equilibrium is not the only equilibrium 
in the positional public good game. In section 3, we analyse the impact of positional preferences on 
social welfare if agents possess identical preferences for status seeking. In section 4, social welfare 
effects are discussed in the case agents have heterogeneous positional preferences by distinguishing in 
the  case  where  initial  endowments  are  homogenous  and  the  case  where  they  are  heterogeneous. 
Section 5 concludes and discusses future research. 
 
2. A model of individual behaviour with positional preferences 
In a theoretical model of voluntary contribution mechanism, we consider individuals motivated by a 
relative standing effect whereby individuals care about their rank as a contributor to the public good 
instead  of  their  absolute  level  of  contribution.  We  consider  a  one-shot  public  good  game  where 











i , 0 ) 
to the public good that maximises the following utility function that is composed of the addition of 
two elements, namely, a monetary payoff and a positional payoff: 
      , , , , , i i j i i i j i i j i U x x x x R x x                   (1)  
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Interestingly, the utility of individual i depends on his own contribution but also on the contributions 
of others not only because of the public good nature (monetary payoff) but also because of relative 
standing issues (positional payoff) (see below). The first part    , i i j xx   is a standard payoff function 
for a voluntary contribution mechanism, defined as follows: 
  , i i j i i i j
ji
G





    
    (2) 
where  i D  represents  the  monetary endowment and p the cost of his contribution. G is the group 
marginal payoff, N is the number of individuals in the group, and 
N
G  is the marginal per capita return 
of the public good. We assume that 
N
G
p   and that p<G , which corresponds to a standard public 
good dilemma assumption. The second part of the payoff function    ,, i i j i R x x   is the positional 
payoff: 
    ,, i i j i i i j R x x x x                       (3) 
where 









j  is the average contribution of all players ( ] , 1 [ N i j   ). 
The positional payoff is composed of two terms: 
- the  difference  between  individual i‟s contribution and the average contribution of all other 
players   j i x x   , which constitutes i‟s relative position compared to others. 
- the positional parameter of the individual  i  . This parameter is specific to each individual and 
measures the nature and strength of positional concerns. If  0 i   , individual i‟s utility increases 
when  i  contributes  less  than  others,  but  if  0 i   ,  individual  i‟s  utility  increases  when  i 
contributes more than others. If  0  i   individual i does not care about his relative standing and 
only  enjoys  the  monetary  payoff,  which  corresponds  to  conventional  homo  economicus 
preferences. 
Given the importance of positional concerns in our framework let us explain further the role played by 
the  positional  parameter.  The  model  considers  that  relative  contribution  influences  utility  levels. 
Interestingly, if someone contributes to the public good at the same amount as others in average (i.e., 
identical relative position), his contribution will not give him other benefits than the monetary payoff. 
Let us assume a higher relative position for individual i, i.e.  j i x x  >0, which means that individual i  
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contributes more than others, in average. Then, if i has a positive positional parameter  0 i    (resp. a 
negative positional parameter  0  i  ), individual i‟s positional payoff increases (resp. decreases). On 
the  opposite,  by  assuming  a  lower  relative  position  for  individual  i,  i.e.    0   j i x x   only  the 
individuals that have a negative positional parameter ( 0  i  ) will increase their positional payoff. In 
this particular case, individual i enjoys benefiting from the public good with a personal contribution 
lower than the average. He enjoys the pleasure of “making a better deal than other players”. Negative 
positional  behavior  differs  from  free-riding  behavior.  A  free  rider  favours  private  consumption 
independently of other players‟ decisions. A player with negative positional preferences chooses the 
level of contribution with respect to the average level of contribution of others. So, in the case of 
negative  positional  preferences,  the    player  aims  to  reduce  his  contribution  relatively  below  the 
average contribution as he enjoys contributing less than others.  
The utility maximising behavior leads to the following proposition: 
 
Lemma 1: An individual with positive positional concerns contributes all his endowment 
(respectively  nothing)  to  the  public  good,  if  the  non-monetary  value  of  his  relative 





 .  Individuals  with  negative positional  concerns  never  contribute  to  the  public 
good. 
 
Proof : The optimal contribution is such that  ( , , )
i
i i j i x Max U x x  . From which, it can be deduced 
that: 
( , , )
0
i i j i
ii
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. The optimal contribution to the public good 
is such that 
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There are two equilibria in this game: zero or all endowment. This diverges from the standard public 
good equilibrium where the equilibrium is to contribute nothing. So,  status seeking may counter-
balance free-riding incentives in a one shot public good game. Figure 1 depicts the slope of the utility 
function as a function of the positional parameter. For individuals with a high enough positional 
parameter, the marginal utility is positive. The more they contribute, the higher their utility.  































Figure1. Marginal utility for individual i as a function of the positional parameter 
 
Our  aim  is  to  analyse  social  welfare  implications  of  positional  preferences  on  public  goods.  We 
consider now an economy composed of N individuals with k contributors to the public good ( k i   1 ) 
and (N-k) free-riders ( N i k   ). According to lemma 1, contributors contribute all their endowment. 
Social welfare when taking into account contributions to the public good is then the sum of utility of 
those who contribute and utility of those who do not contribute: 
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This social welfare is the sum of four terms. The first term is the social gain due to consumption of the 
private good, for the (N-k) individuals who do not contribute to the public good. The second term is 









, and the group marginal payoff is equal to G. The third term is  the positional utility for the  k 
contributors, who draw a positional reward from their own contribution to the public good. The fourth 
term is the positional externality for all individuals: each contribution decreases the position of all 
other individuals. To determine the benchmark, we consider the case where individuals do not possess 
positional  preferences.  In  this  case,  nobody  contributes.  Then,  individual  utility  is  equal  to 
endowment, and social welfare is equal to:  








position   no                     (5) 
The social welfare effect of positional preferences leading to voluntary contributions to public good is 
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The aim of our paper is to determine the impact of positional preferences on social welfare, that is the 
impact of the parameter i   on  W  . In the two following sections, we will analyse the impact of 
positional  preferences  on  social  welfare.  In  section  3,  we  assume  individuals  who  have  identical 
positional preferences, whereas in section 4, agents have different values to their relative position. 
 
3. Private provision of public goods with homogeneous preferences for position 
According  to  Frank  (2005,  2008),  the  consumption  of  positional  goods  necessarily  gives  rise  to 
welfare losses. More precisely, the idea is that if one good is more positional than another good, the 
search  for  status  leads  to  an  increase  of  consumption  of  positional  goods  and  a  decrease  of 
consumption of non positional goods. However, as everyone consumes more of the positional good, 
nobody  increases  her  relative  position.  Individuals  do  not  get  the  expected  positional  benefit. 
Moreover, some resources are diverted to positional goals and social welfare decreases. “As in the 
familiar stadium metaphor, all stand to get a better view, but when all stand no one sees better than 
when all were seated” (Frank, 2008, p. 1778) and certainly everyone suffers legs ache which would 
reduce their global well being. This result is conditional on private positional goods. In the case of 
public goods, where underprovision is frequent, positional concerns may divert some resources from 
private consumption to private provision of public goods. So, positional concerns induce a positive 
externality through collective good consumption (Holländer, 1990). Then if these positive externalities 
can mitigate or even cancel out the free-riding behaviour in the provision of public goods, positional 
preferences may be welfare enhancing. 
 
Proposition 1: If individuals are homogeneous with respect to their relative position, i.e., 
  N j i j i ,..., 2 , 1 ,             , the search for status in public good contribution always 
increases social welfare whatever individuals’ initial endowment, i.e  i D  . 
  
  8 
Proof: All individuals have homogeneous preferences implying equivalent behaviour towards their 
contribution: either all free ride, or all contribute their entire endowment. If all free ride, welfare will 
be  unchanged  by  positional  preferences.  If  all  contribute,  the  social  welfare  effect  of  positional 
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In the case where all individuals have homogeneous preferences even if the search for status motivates 
their contribution to public good, the global gain of status-seeking is nil. No one will obtain positional 
gains or losses as in the case of private goods (Frank, 2005, 2008). The positional benefits from some 
individuals will be counterbalanced by positional losses of the others. This result can be explained by 
our  assumption  of  homogeneous  preferences  (all  individual  give  the  same  value  to  their  relative 
position)  and  our  definition  of  relative  position  (comparison  between  individual  and  average 
contribution of all other individuals). Even if positional preferences do not increase positional benefits, 
because the positional good is a public good, it is overprovided as compared with the benchmark 
provision and social welfare increases. In other words, positional preferences can prevent free-rider 
behaviour. Of course the gain in public good depends mainly on the group marginal payoff. 
 
4. Private provision of public goods with heterogeneous preferences for position 
It is more realistic and consistent with empirical investigations (e.g., Solnick and Hemenway, 2005) to 
assume that individuals do not give the same value to status. For instance, Charness and Rabin (2002) 
showed  experimentally  that  some  participants  made  choices  motivated  by  search  for  status  while 
others do not. If individuals differ in their positional preferences, do positional preferences still lead to 
increases of social welfare?  The overall outcome on social welfare still depends on two kinds of 
effects. First, an effect of voluntary public good provision due to the diversion of some resources from 
the non-positional good (here the private good) to the positional good, which is always positive (see 
section 3). Second, a positional effect, which might no longer be cancelled out and can either be 
positive or negative. Indeed, individuals will choose their respective contributions depending on their 
positional preferences (parameter  i  ). Their contributions depend both on their positional preferences 
and their endowments which both can vary from one agent to another. So individuals end up with 
various relative positions.   
  9 
 
Proposition 2: Assume that individuals differ in their positional preferences.  
-  If  all  individuals  have  identical  endowments,  then  positional  preferences  in  public 
goods provision lead to an increase in social welfare. 
-  If individuals have heterogeneous endowments, then the effect of positional preferences 
in public goods provision on social welfare is ambiguous.  
 
Proof: Suppose all individuals have identical endowments ( D Di  ) and there are k contributors. The 
social welfare gain of positional preferences can then be written as follows: 
 
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This  proposition  shows  that  when  all  individuals  have  the  same  endowment,  social  welfare  is 
increased  by  positional  choices  on  public  good  contribution  not  only  because  of  the  positive 
externality  on  public  good  consumption,  but  also  because  the  positional  benefit  of  those  who 
contribute is higher than the positional loss of non-contributors. Indeed those who contribute have 
higher positional taste ( i  ) than those who do not contribute. Unlike Frank (2005), this result shows 
that heterogeneous positional preferences with identical endowments can ultimately enhance social 
welfare.   
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In the case of heterogeneous endowments, this result can be reversed. The contribution varies from 
one  individual  to  another  not  only  because  of  differing  positional  preferences  but  also  because 
individuals  possess  different  endowments.  The  positional  effect  on  contributors  and  on  non-
contributors is  therefore  uncertain. The  positional  effect  on  contributors  depends  on  their relative 




















i  (how much they contribute when compared to others) 




p i    ). If they contribute more than others (on average), they will benefit from an increased 
relative position. But if they have a lower endowment than other contributors, they then lose in terms 






















i . If their positional taste is high, which means that they 
really care about relative position, their loss of utility will then be very high. The other effect that 
composes the positional effect is the  one on non-contributors. If non-contributors have negative 
positional tastes (i<0) they prefer contributing less than others and benefit from a decrease in their 
relative  position.  Also,  when  non-contributors  have  positive  positional  preferences,  but  not  high 
enough  to  contribute 
N
G
p i    ,  they  will  suffer  a  loss  from  contributing  less  than  others.  So, 
positional preferences on public good contribution might lead to a decrease in social welfare because 
of an overall negative effect on positional externalities when individuals possess different positional 
preferences and endowments, even if there is always a positive effect due to public good provision. 
Interestingly, if individuals have heterogeneous positional preferences (and different endowments) and 
if  they  compare  their  contribution  to  the  average  contribution  of  other  persons  having  the  same 
endowment, then the first part of proposition 2 applies and positional preferences in public good 
provision lead to an increase in social welfare
3. Indeed, it seems more realistic to assume that people 
                                                            
3 If individuals do compare their con tribution to the average contribution of other persons having the same 
endowment  their  utility  may  then  be  written  as: 
)
1
( ) , , ( ) , , (
,
, , 
   
 
      I
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i i I k I j i j i I k I j i j i i   
where I denotes the group of individuals having the same endowment as individual i,  
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i  defined 
by comparison to the average contribution of individuals having the same endowment as individual i. 
It is then easy to show that positional concerns in public good provision lead to an increase of social welfare 
(increase of public good provision, and overall positive positional payoff). 
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do compare themselves with similar persons. Aristotle argued that „we envy those who are near us in 
time, place, age, or reputation‟ (Rhetoric, 1338a). For instance, Ted Turner is engaged in a competition 
with the wealthiest Americans, and does not care about his position relative to poorest persons. In the 
same vein, Clark and Oswald (1996) showed that individuals compare themselves to reference groups 
including other persons similar to themselves on some dimensions.  
 
6. Concluding remarks 
Using a model of consumer behaviour, we showed that positional concerns regarding public goods 
contribution can increase social welfare, especially when all individuals have the same positional 
preferences. In this particular case, social welfare increases because of a higher provision level of the 
public  good  while  the  overall  effect  on  positional  revenue  is  nil  because  the  increase  in  relative 
position of some individuals is cancelled out by the loss of relative position of others. In the case 
where  all  individuals  have  the  same  endowment  and  different  positional  preferences,  positional 
concerns on public good provision also improve social welfare because of two positive effects: an 
increase in public good provision and a positive sum-game on position. This overall positional benefit 
comes from the fact that those who give more value to status get the higher status, and those who get a 
lower status (as they do not make any expenditure for status) give less value to status. This result also 
holds when the status is defined by comparison to similar (in income) individuals, in case of different 
endowments. If individuals have heterogeneous positional preferences and if the status is defined by 
comparison to individuals who have different endowments, status seeking in public good provision 
may decrease social welfare if negative externalities on status are larger than benefit from public good 
provision.  
 
Since positional preferences to public good provision may increase voluntary contribution to public 
goods, eradication, e.g., through progressive taxation, of all status-seeking behavior through public 
intervention is not always desirable. While positional races on private goods can be detrimental to 
social  welfare  (Frank,  2005),  positional  races  on  public  goods  can  be  conducive  to  Paretian 
improvements. Consequently, a major issue to policymakers is to limit positional races in the private 
goods domain while promoting them in the public goods domain. It is widely admitted that positional 
preferences are more likely to remain latent if there is no socially visible way to rank individuals on 
the  considered  dimension.  From  a  practical  viewpoint,  „social  visibility‟  can  stimulate  positional 
choices  in  the  public  goods  realm.  Interestingly,  experimental  evidence  regarding  contribution  to 
public goods (where the common pool is not divided among participants but invested in stabilizing 
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climate change) shows that much greater personal support is obtained when the subjects are allowed to 
make their contributions in public as compared with anonymous investments (Milinski et al., 2006). In 
the  same  vein,  a  recent  marketing  study  showed  that  status  competition  can  promote  pro-
environmental behaviour, even at a private cost for individuals (Griskevicius et al., 2010). The authors 
argue that „visible‟ ecofriendly purchases (by contrasting shopping alone online with shopping in 
public) are rooted in the idea of competitive altruism, that is people compete for status by trying to 
appear more altruistic. The huge success of Toyota Prius in United States, when most other hybrid 
models struggle to find buyers is frequently attributed to its ability to confer status to its owners.  
 
Positional concerns are complex and depend largely on the interactions between several parameters 
such as the type and scarcity of public good involved and the reference group to which this individual 
wishes to belong and so on (Solnick and Hemenway, 2005). For example, according to the reference 
group, some public goods serve as positional markers and can generate positive-sum positional races 
while other public goods cannot, leading to less socially desirable outcomes in terms of public goods 
provision. Nevertheless, the situation is not fixed and can vary across time and space. In addition to 
improve the social visibility of some public goods contributions, policymakers can also promote new 
reference groups by manufacturing additional dimensions of status.  
 
Solnick and Hemenway (2005) showed that positional concerns about relative position are stronger in 
some domains than in others, by contrasting private and public goods. Our analysis considers only 
positional concerns about contributions to a public good („Do I contribute more or less than others, 
and  how  much ?‟).  Our  results  about  individuals‟choice  and  their  welfare  implications  would  be 
different  if  we  assume  that  individuals  have  also  some  positional  preferences  on  private  good 
consumption  and  some  other  positional  preferences  on  contributions  to  public  goods.  Some 
individuals can seek to occupy top positions in several races, regardless of their private or public 
natures. As said Ted Turner: "My hand shook when I signed the papers," he recalls, about his first big 
gifts to universities and the environment, "because I knew I was taking myself out of the running for 
the richest man in America". (Dowd, 1996). A natural extension to our study will be to analyze the 
overall impact of different combinations of positional preferences regarding public and private goods 
on the whole economy.  
  13 
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